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Abstract 
Twenty years ago, Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Römer (1993) proposed that expert performance 
reflects a long period of deliberate practice rather than innate ability, or “talent.” Ericsson et al. found 
that elite musicians had accumulated thousands of hours more deliberate practice than less 
accomplished musicians, and concluded that deliberate practice provides “a sufficient account of the 
major facts about the nature and scarcity of exceptional performance” (p. 392). The deliberate practice 
view has since gained popularity as a theoretical account of expert performance, but here we show that 
deliberate practice is not sufficient to explain individual differences in performance in the two most 
widely studied domains in expertise research—chess and music. For researchers interested in advancing 
the science of expert performance, the task now is to develop and rigorously test theories that take into 
account as many potentially relevant explanatory constructs as possible.  
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Deliberate Practice: Is That All It Takes To Become An Expert? 
Psychologists have been intensely interested in how people become experts in music, the arts, 
science, games, sports, and professions for as long as psychology has been a field. Sir Francis Galton 
(1869) analyzed genealogical records of scientists, musicians, writers, poets, painters, athletes, and 
other men of “eminence” and found that they tended to be biologically related. He noted, for example, 
that there were more than twenty eminent musicians in the Bach family. Acknowledging a role for 
“zeal” and “an adequate power of doing a great deal of very laborious work” (p. 37), Galton concluded 
that “genius” arises from innate ability. John Watson (1930), the founder of behaviorism, famously 
captured the opposing view:  
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in 
and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I 
might select–doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, 
regardless of his talents… (p. 104).  
Watson added that “practicing more intensively than others…is probably the most reasonable 
explanation we have today not only for success in any line, but even for genius” (p. 212). Thus the 
pendulum has swung between nature and nurture—the view that experts are “born” and the view that 
they are “made.”  
More recently, K. Anders Ericsson and his colleagues (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993) 
sided with Watson when they proposed that expert performance—consistently superior performance in 
a domain—reflects a long period of deliberate practice rather than innate ability, or “talent.” Ericsson et 
al. defined deliberate practice as engagement in highly structured activities that are specifically designed 
to improve performance in a domain through immediate feedback, that require a high level of 
concentration, and that are not inherently enjoyable. Ericsson et al. distinguished deliberate practice 
from two other forms of domain-specific experience—work and play—as follows: 
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Work includes public performance, competitions, services rendered for pay, and other activities 
directly motivated by external rewards. Play includes activities that have no explicit goal and 
that are inherently enjoyable. Deliberate practice includes activities that have been specially 
designed to improve the current level of performance. (p. 368) 
 
To test their theory, Ericsson et al. (1993) asked violinists at a Berlin music academy to rate 
various activities on relevance to improving violin performance, on effort, and on enjoyableness. Then 
they asked the violinists to provide estimates of the time they had devoted to the activities for each age 
since starting violin. Ericsson et al. found that the students whom the faculty had nominated as the 
“best” violinists had accumulated an average of over 10,000 hours of deliberate practice by age 20, 
which was about 2,500 hours more than the average for the “good” violinists and about 5,000 hours 
more than the average for the least accomplished “teacher” group. In a second study, Ericsson et al. 
(1993) found that “expert” pianists had similarly accumulated an average of over 10,000 hours of 
deliberate practice by age 20, compared to not even 2,000 hours for “amateur” pianists.  
Applying their framework to several domains, Ericsson et al. (1993) concluded that “high levels 
of deliberate practice are necessary to attain expert level performance” (p. 392)—and in the next 
sentence added:  
Our theoretical framework can also provide a sufficient account of the major facts about the 
nature and scarcity of exceptional performance. Our account does not depend on scarcity of 
innate ability (talent)….We attribute the dramatic differences in performance between experts 
and amateurs-novices to similarly large differences in the recorded amounts of deliberate 
practice. (p. 392, emphasis added) 
Ericsson et al. (1993) then explained that “individual differences in ultimate performance can largely be 
accounted for by differential amounts of past and current levels of practice” (p. 392) and that “the 
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differences between expert performers and normal adults reflect a life-long period of deliberate effort 
to improve performance in a specific domain” (p. 400).  
Ericsson et al. (1993) allowed that genes may contribute to individual differences in people’s 
willingness to engage in deliberate practice over a long period of time, and thus may indirectly 
contribute to individual differences in performance, but as the preceding quotations make clear, they 
explicitly rejected the view that innate ability can account for why some people become experts and 
other fail to do so. Ericsson, Nandagopal, and Roring (2005) recently reiterated this perspective:  
…individual differences in genetically determined capacities and fixed structures required for the 
development of elite performance appear to be quite limited, perhaps even restricted, to a 
small number of physical characteristics, such as height and body size. The expert-performance 
framework attempts to explain the large individual differences in performance in terms of 
individual differences in sustained deliberate practice. (p. 305) 
Similarly, Ericsson (2007) argued that “it is possible to account for the development of elite performance 
among healthy children without recourse to unique talent (genetic endowment)—excepting the innate 
determinants of body size” (p. 4) and that “distinctive characteristics of elite performers are adaptations 
to extended and intense practice activities that selectively activate dormant genes that all healthy 
children’s DNA contain” (p. 4). Ericsson, Prietula, and Cokely (2007) wrote more simply that “The only 
innate differences that turn out to be significant—and they matter primarily in sports—are height and 
body size” (p. 1, emphasis added). 
Impact and Criticisms of the Deliberate Practice View 
As two of us noted in a recent New York Times op-ed (Hambrick & Meinz, 2011), Ericsson and 
colleagues’ research has captured the popular imagination, perhaps because of its meritocratic appeal—
the implication that nearly anyone can become an expert with enough hard work. In his bestselling book 
Outliers, the writer Malcolm Gladwell (2008) summarized Ericsson et al.’s (1993) findings and then 
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described the opportunity to practice as the major theme of the biographies of Bill Gates and The 
Beatles. Ericsson and colleagues’ research is discussed in a number of other popular books, including 
Daniel Levitin’s (2006) This is Your Brain on Music, Geoff Colvin’s Talent is Overrated (2010), Daniel 
Pink’s Drive (2009), Daniel Coyle’s The Talent Code (2009), David Shenk’s The Genius in All of Us (2010), 
Matthew Syed’s Bounce (2010), and David Brooks’ The Social Animal (2011).  
The Ericsson et al. (1993) article has been cited in the scientific literature over a thousand times 
(Source: Web of Science), making it a “citation classic” many times over, and Ericsson and colleagues 
have been praised for advancing scientific understanding of expert performance. Freeman (2007) 
observed that “The field of gifted and talented research is in serious need of scientific work of this 
calibre, as distinct from theories, models and anecdotes” (p. 65), and Kaufman (2007) commented that 
“The expert performance approach championed by Ericsson et al. provides a scientific way forward for 
research on giftedness, and offers exciting new ways to further our understanding of the determinants 
of high ability within a particular domain of expertise” (p. 71).  
At the same time, Ericsson and colleagues’ view has been roundly criticized on conceptual and 
methodological grounds. Gardner (1995) commented that the deliberate practice view “requires a 
blindness to ordinary experience” (p. 803), and Sternberg (1996) observed that “Most people who want 
to become experts—whether violinists, skiers, physicists, or whatever—do not make it. They drop out 
along the way” (p. 350). Schneider (1998) questioned “the basic assumption that progress in a given 
domain is solely a function of deliberate practice” (p. 424), and Detterman, Gabriel, and Ruthsatz (1998) 
predicted that deliberate practice “will not equalize outcome despite the best of intentions” (p. 412). 
Anderson (2000) concluded that “Ericsson and Krampe’s research does not really establish the case that 
a great deal of practice is sufficient for great talent” (p. 324), and Winner (2000) observed that 
“Ericsson's research demonstrated the importance of hard work but did not rule out the role of innate 
ability” (p. 160). Marcus (2012) noted that deliberate practice “does indeed matter—a lot—and in 
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surprising ways” but that “it would be a logical error to infer from the importance of practice that talent 
is somehow irrelevant, as if the two were in mutual opposition” (p. 95), and Ackerman (2012) added 
that factors other than deliberate practice “must clearly play a role in the demonstration of expert 
performance….” (p. 9). Finally, both Hambrick and Meinz (2011) and Campitelli and Gobet (2011) 
concluded that deliberate practice is necessary but not sufficient to account for individual differences in 
performance. There is widespread skepticism, then, over Ericsson and colleagues’ strong claims 
regarding the importance of deliberate practice for acquiring expert performance. 
Present Research 
Here, we evaluated the deliberate practice view on empirical grounds. The fundamental 
question that we set out to address is whether deliberate practice is as important for explaining 
individual differences in performance as Ericsson and colleagues have argued it is. That is, can individual 
differences in performance largely be accounted for by individual differences in deliberate practice? Is 
deliberate practice all it takes to become an expert?  
To answer this question, we reanalyzed findings from research on the two must widely studied 
domains in expertise research: chess and music. There were two criteria for including a study in the 
reanalysis: (a) continuous measures of performance and of cumulative amount of deliberate practice 
were collected, and (b) a correlation between these measures was reported. For a given study, our 
question was how much of the variance in performance deliberate practice explained.  
To foreshadow, we found that deliberate practice does not account for all, nearly all, or even 
most of the variance in performance in these domains. We conclude that deliberate practice is not as 
important for explaining individual differences in performance as Ericsson and colleagues have argued it 
is, and review evidence for other factors that may also directly contribute. 
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General Method 
As Spearman (1904) first observed, accurate empirical tests of theories are not possible without 
controlling for the distorting effect of measurement error variance—that is, the unreliability of the 
measures (see Schmidt & Hunter, 1999, for an excellent review). This critical point is reflected in the 
general formula for a correlation in classical measurement theory: rxy = rxtyt(rxxryy)
1/2, where rxy is the 
observed correlation between any two measures x and y, rxtyt is the correlation between the true scores 
underlying the measures, and rxx and ryy are the reliabilities of x and y, respectively (Hunter & Schmidt, 
1990). This formula is called the attenuation formula because it shows how measurement error variance 
(i.e., unreliability) in one or both measures reduces the observed correlation below the true-score 
correlation. Solving algebraically for rxtyt yields the standard disattenuation formula for correcting 
correlations for measurement error variance: rxtyt = rxy / (rxxryy)
1/2. We used the disattenuation formula to 
correct correlations for measurement error variance in both deliberate practice and performance. For a 
given study, we report the observed correlation and corrected correlation ( rˆ ), with 95% confidence 
intervals.  
The reliability of retrospective estimates of deliberate practice is of particular concern, because 
people obviously do not have perfect memory for the past. However, Tuffiash, Roring, and Ericsson 
(2007) stated that “self-report practice estimates repeatedly from experts in sports and music have 
reported test-retest reliabilities at or above .80” (p. 129), which is “good” or better reliability by 
psychometric standards (Cronbach, 1990). Similarly, Ericsson (2012) claimed that “the collected 
reliability of cumulated life-time practise at different test occasions in large samples has typically been 
found to range between 0.7 and 0.8” (p. 2). Indeed, several studies have demonstrated that estimates of 
cumulative deliberate practice have reasonably high reliability. Ericsson et al. (1993) found a correlation 
of .74 between retrospective and diary-based estimates of deliberate practice for a current typical week 
and concluded that “subjects should be able to accurately report not just their current level of practice, 
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but past levels of practice as well” (p. 379), and in a study of musicians, Tuffiash (2002) found a test-
retest correlation of .89 between estimates of cumulative deliberate practice. de Bruin, Rikers, and 
Schmidt (2007) found a correlation of .60 between diary-based and retrospective estimates for a current 
typical week, and Bilalid, McLeod, and Gobet (2007) found correlations of .99 and .98 between diary-
based and retrospective estimates of chess practice over two school terms.  
Based on this evidence, we assumed reliability of .80 for cumulative deliberate practice, in line 
with Ericsson and colleagues’ estimates (Ericsson, 2012; Tuffiash et al., 2007), but we also tested the 
sensitivity of our analyses to different reliability assumptions. We discuss the reliability of measures of 
chess and music performance separately by domain below. 
I. Chess Studies 
 Chess has been called the Drosophila—the model “organism”—for research on expertise 
because it offers an objective measure of performance in the Elo rating, and because it is possible to 
develop representative tasks for laboratory research (e.g., choose-a-move tasks). We identified six 
studies, listed in Table 1, that met the criteria for our reanalysis.1 Except where noted, participants in 
these studies completed a survey to assess chess-related experience in which they provided information 
such as the age they started playing chess seriously and the number of years of instruction, and for each 
age since taking up the game estimated the number of hours per typical week they had spent studying 
chess alone—the activity that expertise researchers have identified as meeting the theoretical 
description of deliberate practice for chess (e.g., Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Ericsson, 2007). In each 
study, the measure that can be interpreted as reflecting cumulative deliberate practice was obtained by 
summing across annual estimates (i.e., hours for a typical week x 52); this measure was log-transformed 
to normalize the data and allow for a linear test of the relationship between deliberate practice and 
                                                          
1
One study we did not include in our reanalysis was by Grabner, Stern, and Neubauer (2007). They collected measures of 
deliberate practice and chess rating in 90 chess players, which correlated .08 (ns). We omit this study, because the measure of 
deliberate practice only reflected the current year. 
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performance. The measure of performance was chess rating, which the authors of the studies verified 
against published ratings lists whenever possible. 
Charness et al.’s (2005) participants were chess players recruited from Canada, Germany, 
Russia, and the United States; in Study 1 there was no restriction on participation in terms of chess 
rating, whereas in Study 2 the minimum chess rating was 1600. Bilalid, McLeod, and Gobet’s (2007) 
participants included youth chess players. (The measure of practice in this study was the amount of time 
spent playing chess.) Gobet and Campitelli’s (2007) participants were Argentine chess players recruited 
from a prestigious chess club in Buenos Aires. de Bruin et al.’s (2007) participants were youth who had 
been selected for a national chess training program run by the Dutch Chess Federation. Howard’s (2012) 
participants were chess players who had completed an online survey with two questions about chess 
practice, which was advertised on chess websites and was available in several languages.2 (The measure 
of practice in this study was simply studying chess, instead of studying chess alone.) The standard 
deviation (SD) for chess rating in these studies was in most cases close to the theoretical SD of 200 for 
chess rating (Elo, 1986) and the actual SD (of 239) for the January, 2012, World Chess Federation rating 
list.3 The average SD across studies was 212.7, and thus there was no overall indication of range 
restriction in chess skill. 
To obtain an estimate of the reliability of chess rating, we computed correlations between 
expected outcome in chess tournaments and actual outcome. We used the past five Chess Olympiads 
and the past five European Individual Championships. For the Chess Olympiads (Ns = 128 to 156), we 
correlated team rating (i.e., the average rating of each teams’ five members) with tournament outcome. 
Similarly, for the European Individual Championship (Ns = 303 to 402), we correlated player rating with 
                                                          
2
The sample in Charness et al.’s (2005) Study 1 included a smaller sample described in a chapter by Charness, Krampe, and 
Mayr (1996); we do not include this sample in our reanalysis given that it was a subset of the later sample. Gobet and Campitelli 
(2007) distinguished between and measured two types of deliberate practice, individual practice and group practice; we include 
only the results for individual practice because of the focus on this activity in the expertise literature as a form of deliberate 
practice. 
 
3
We thank Robert W. Howard for sending us this information. 
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tournament outcome. Consistent with Charness et al.’s (2005) comment that chess rating is highly 
reliable, and with reports of strong correlations between chess rating and other measures of chess 
performance (e.g., Bilalid et al., 2007; Burns, 2004; van der Maas & Wagenmakers, 2005), the 
correlations were strongly positive, ranging from .93 to .96 for the Chess Olympiads (avg. r = .94) and 
from .83 to .93 for the European Individual Championships (avg. r = .88). We used the overall average of 
.91 as the reliability coefficient for chess rating in our reanalysis.4   
Results of Chess Reanalyses 
Correlations between deliberate practice and chess performance, with 95% confidence intervals 
(CIs), are displayed in Table 1. On average, deliberate practice explained 34% of the variance in 
performance after correcting for measurement error variance (avg. rˆ = .57), leaving 66% of the variance 
unexplained and potentially explainable by other factors (see Figure 1). The 95% CI included 1.0 in Bilalid 
et al. (2007), but the confidence interval was very wide ( rˆ = .81, 95% CI, .46, 1.0) due to a small sample 
size (N = 23).5 (Note also that the correlation between practice and chess performance dropped from .69 
to .60 after Bilalid et al. statistically controlled for IQ, which yields rˆ = .70, 95% CI, .29, .95.) 
There was a wide range of ages in some of the studies (e.g., Charness et al., 2005), which could 
represent a confound. To control for age differences, we computed partial correlations (pr) reflecting 
the relationship between deliberate practice and chess performance controlling for age. We then 
corrected the partial correlations for the unreliability of deliberate practice and chess rating (assuming 
reliability of .80 for deliberate practice and .91 for chess rating). The average corrected partial 
correlation was nearly the same as the average corrected correlation (avg. rpˆ  = .64 vs. avg. rˆ  = .60).   
                                                          
4
We deleted players that abandoned the tournament three rounds before the end or earlier (at most 3% of players, and usually 
less than 1%). We chose the Chess Olympiad and European Individual Championship to compute the reliability estimate, 
because in other Open tournaments the rate of forfeit is much higher.  
 
5
Bilalid et al.’s (2007) total sample included both the “elite” subsample (n = 23) listed in Table 1 and a subsample of unrated 
players (n = 34). Bilalid et al. found a very high correlation (r = .90) between scores on a “chess test” that included questions 
about the rules of chess and chess problems. However, this correlation was inflated, because practice accounted for only 29% 
of the variance in scores on the test after Bilalid et al. statistically controlling for confounding factors (age, gender, IQ).      
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 Our analyses would have underestimated the contribution of deliberate practice if reliability of 
this measure was lower than .80, as it may have been in (for example) Howard’s (2012) study given the 
use of a brief internet survey (Ericsson & Moxley’s, 2012), or overestimated this contribution if it was 
higher than .80, as it may have been in Charness et al.’s (2005) exemplary studies. Therefore, we 
performed a sensitivity analysis in which we assumed different levels of reliability for deliberate 
practice. Results are shown in Table 2. Even assuming a low level of reliability (rxx = .60), deliberate 
practice left a very large proportion of the variance in chess performance unexplained (54.7%). 
Discussion of Chess Reanalyses 
On average, deliberate practice accounted for 34% of the reliable variance in chess 
performance, leaving 66% unexplained and potentially explainable by other factors. We conclude that 
deliberate practice is not sufficient to account for individual differences in chess performance.  
The implication of this conclusion is that some people require much less deliberate practice than 
other people to reach an elite level of performance in chess. We illustrate this point in Figure 2 using 
Gobet and Campitelli’s (2007) chess sample, with the 90 players classified based on their chess ratings as 
“master” (≥ 2,200, n = 16), “expert” (≥ 2,000, n = 31), or “intermediate” (< 2,000, n = 43). There were 
large differences in mean amount of deliberate practice across the skill groups: master M = 10,530 hours 
(SD = 7,414), expert M = 5,673 hours (SD = 4,654), and intermediate M = 3,179 hours (SD = 4,615). 
However, as the SDs suggest, there were very large ranges of deliberate practice within skill groups. For 
example, the range for the masters was 832 to 24,284 hours—a difference of nearly three orders of 
magnitude. Furthermore, there was overlap in distributions between skill groups. For example, of the 16 
masters, 31.3% (n = 5) had less deliberate practice than the mean of the expert group, one skill level 
down, and 12.5% (n = 2) had less deliberate practice than the mean of the intermediate group, two skill 
levels down. In the other direction, of the 31 intermediates, 25.8% (n = 8) had more deliberate practice 
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than the mean of the expert group, one skill level up, and 12.9% (n = 4) had even more deliberate 
practice than the mean of the master group, two skill levels up.   
Howard’s (2011) case study of the three Polgár sisters provides further support for our 
conclusion. Beginning at a young age, the three Polgár sisters received several hours of chess instruction 
every day from chess grandmasters and their father, a chess teacher and author of several chess books. 
Using practice estimates obtained from biographical and autobiographical accounts, Howard found that 
the sisters differed both in the highest rating they achieved and in the amount of practice they 
accumulated to reach that rating. For example, one sister’s peak rating was 2,735 in an estimated 
59,904 hours of practice, whereas another sister’s was 2,577—more than a standard deviation lower—
in an estimated 79,248 hours of practice. Howard also found that the two sisters who became 
grandmasters had accumulated a great deal more practice by the time they reached their peak rating 
than had the eight grandmasters in his sample who reached top-ten in the world (M = 14,020.5 hours, 
SD = 7,373.96 hours). Deliberate practice is clearly not sufficient to account for individual differences in 
chess performance. 
II. Music 
Music is another popular domain for psychological research on expertise. In fact, although chess 
has been called the Drosophila for research on expertise, at least as many articles have been published 
on music expertise (see Hambrick & Meinz, 2012, for a review). We identified eight studies, listed in 
Table 3, that met the criteria for our reanalysis.6 Participants in these studies completed a survey to 
assess music-related experience in which they provided information such as the age they started playing 
music seriously and number of years of lessons, and for each age since taking up their instrument 
estimated the number of hours per typical week they had spent practicing alone—the activity that 
                                                          
6
One study we did not include in our reanalysis was by Bonneville-Roussy, Lavigne, and Vallerand (2011). They collected 
measures of deliberate practice and music skill in 187 classical musicians, which correlated .23 (p < .01). We omit this study 
because the measure of deliberate practice was not a direct time estimate but instead was based on Likert ratings of frequency 
of engagement in practice activities (e.g., “When I do my daily practice…I slowly repeat difficult excerpts”).  
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Ericsson et al. (1993) identified as meeting the theoretical description of deliberate practice for music. In 
each study, the measure that can be interpreted as reflecting cumulative deliberate practice was 
obtained by summing across annual estimates (i.e., hours for a typical week x 52). The deliberate 
practice measure was log-transformed in Lehmann and Ericsson (1996) and Meinz and Hambrick (2010). 
No transformation was performed in the other studies, but there is evidence that log-transformations 
have only small effects on amount of variance explained (Macnamara, Hambrick, & Oswald, 2013).  
Five studies in Table 3 used piano sight-reading as a task, with various performance measures. 
Meinz’s (2000) and Meinz and Hambrick’s (2010) participants were pianists with a wide range of skill 
levels (beginning to advanced), and the measure of performance was the average of expert ratings of 
test performances across pieces. Our reliability estimates (.96 and .99, respectively) were the coefficient 
alphas for these measures. Tuffiash’s (2002) participants were college undergraduates, including music 
majors and non-majors, and the performance measure was the highest level of difficulty at which a 
participant received a high rating (8/10 or higher) by both expert rater. Our reliability estimate (.80) was 
test-retest reliability for the first level of difficulty, which was based on the entire sample. Lehman and 
Ericsson’s (1996) participants were highly skilled accompanists or piano soloists; an additional task was 
accompanying, and the performance measure for both tasks was the number of correctly played notes. 
Our reliability estimate (.88) was the correlation of number of correctly played notes with expert ratings 
of performance reported by Lehmann and Ericsson (1993). Kopiez and Lee’s (2008) participants were 
current or past piano majors from a music institute, and the performance measure was again the 
number of correctly played notes. Reliability was not reported, and therefore our reliability estimate 
(.88) was the same as for Lehman and Ericsson (1996). 
The remaining three studies in Table 3—Study 1, Study 2A, and Study 2B of Ruthsatz, 
Detterman, Griscom, and Cirullo’s (2008)—reported global measures of musical performance. In Study 
1, participants were high school band members, and the performance measure was rank in the band. In 
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Study 2A, participants were music institute students, and the performance measure was audition score.   
In Study 2B, participants were undergraduate music majors and the performance measure was faculty 
rating of musical achievement. Our reliability estimate (.80) was based on previous demonstrations of 
internal consistency, test-retest, and inter-rater reliability of .80 or higher for similar measures of 
musical achievement (e.g., Bergee, 2003; Hash, 2012; Kinney, 2009; Lien & Humphreys, 2001). (Note 
that in the Ruthsatz et al. studies deliberate practice included practice alone and lessons.)  
There is no standardized measure of performance in music as there is in chess, but there was an 
extremely wide range of music skill in some of the studies. Tuffiash’s (2002) sample included both non-
music majors recruited from an introductory psychology course and music majors from one of the top 
colleges of music in the U.S., and Meinz’s (2000) and Meinz and Hambrick’s (2010) participants ranged 
from beginner to professional.  
Results of Music Reanalyses 
Correlations between deliberate practice and music performance, with 95% confidence intervals 
(CIs), are displayed in Table 3. On average, deliberate practice explained 28.9% of the variance in 
performance after correcting for measurement error variance (avg. rˆ = .54), leaving 71.1% of the 
variance unexplained and potentially explainable by other factors (see Figure 3). The 95% CI included 1.0 
in Ruthsatz et al. (2007), Study 2B, but the confidence interval was extremely wide ( rˆ = .68, 95% CI, .14, 
1.0) due to a small sample size (N = 19). Note also that the correlation was much smaller in Ruthsatz et 
al.’s Study 2A ( rˆ = .39, 95% CI, .09, .65), which used the same method but a larger sample (N = 64). 
There was a wide age range in two studies, Meinz (2000) and Meinz and Hambrick (2010), but 
partialing age had almost no effect on the corrected correlations (change in rˆ , .00 and .03, respectively). 
The age ranges were much narrower in other studies, as the samples mainly included similar-aged 
students, and age correlations were not reported.)  
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We again performed an analysis in which we assumed different levels of reliability for deliberate 
practice. Results are shown in Table 4. As for chess, even assuming a low level of reliability (rxx = .60), 
deliberate practice left a very large proportion of the variance unexplained (60.4%).  
Discussion of Music Reanalyses 
On average across studies, deliberate practice accounted for about 29% of the reliable variance 
in music performance, leaving about 71% unexplained and potentially explainable by other factors. We 
conclude that deliberate practice is not sufficient to account for individual differences in music 
performance.  
Results of other studies provide further support for this conclusion. Simonton (1991) found a 
large amount of variability in the amount of time it took famous classical composers to have their first 
“hit,” and that the interval between the first composition and the first hit correlated significantly and 
negatively with maximum annual output, lifetime productivity, and posthumous reputation. Composers 
who rose to fame quickly—the most “talented”—had the most successful careers. Furthermore, 
Sloboda, Davidson, Howe, and Moore (1996) noted that although students at a selective music school 
(“high achievers”) had accumulated more “formal practice” than students who were learning an 
instrument at a non-music school (“pleasure players”), there were some individuals at each skill level 
who did “less than 20 per cent of the mean amount of practice” and others who did “over four times as 
much practice than average…” (p. 301).  
Ericsson et al.’s (1993) findings provide further support for our conclusion. Ericsson et al. did not 
report variability statistics for deliberate practice—no standard deviations, variances, or ranges.7 
However, the log-transformed values in their Figure 15 indicate that deliberate practice in their study of 
                                                          
7
We contacted K. Anders Ericsson, Ralf Th. Krampe, and Clemens Tesch-Römer and requested their data; they are unable to 
provide it at this time.  
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pianists (Study 2) ranged from about 10,000 to 30,000 hours in the expert group.8 The most practiced 
expert could have been no more than 11 years older than the least practiced expert (i.e., age 31 vs. 20), 
and yet the difference in deliberate practice between these subjects was about 20,000 hours.9 At 4 
hours a day, 365 days a year, it would take nearly 14 years to accumulate this amount of deliberate 
practice, suggesting that some of Ericsson et al.’s pianists required much less deliberate practice than 
others to become experts. 
General Discussion 
Deliberate practice does not account for all, nearly all, or even most of the variance in 
performance in chess and music, the two most widely studied domains in expertise research. Put 
another way, deliberate practice accounts for a considerable amount of the variance in performance, 
but leaves a much larger amount of the variance unexplained. The bottom line is that deliberate practice 
is necessary to account for why some people become experts in these domains and others fail to do so, 
but not sufficient. So what else matters? 
Starting Age 
Starting at a young age may be one factor. Ericsson et al. (1993) argued that starting age 
influences performance insofar as it relates to the amount of deliberate practice an individual has 
accumulated: “An individual starting at an earlier age would have accumulated more deliberate practice 
and thus have acquired a higher level of performance” (p. 388). A testable prediction that follows from 
this idea is that the effect of starting age on performance should be mediated through deliberate 
                                                          
8
We digitized the three graphs in Ericsson et al.’s (1993) Figure 15, extracted the values using Dagra’s graphical extraction 
software, and back-transformed log accumulated hours of practice to accumulated hours of practice. With respect to Figure 15, 
Ericsson et al. (1993) report very high correlations (rs > -.85) between cumulative deliberate practice and latency measures 
from a complex movement task—but these would have been highly inflated by the use of extreme-groups design in Study 2 
(i.e., experts vs. amateurs). 
   
9
The age range for the expert pianists in Study 2, which Ericsson et al. (1993) noted was part of Ralf Krampe’s dissertation, is 
not reported in Ericsson et al.’s article. We found this information in Krampe’s dissertation and in Krampe and Ericsson’s (1996) 
later report of data from this study; the age range is listed as 20 to 32 years in Krampe’s dissertation and 20 to 31 years in 
Krampe and Ericsson (1996); we rely on the published report. We thank Daniela Regel, Max Planck Institute, for sending us a 
copy of Krampe’s dissertation (1994 Sigma edition). 
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practice. However, Gobet and Campitelli (2007) and Howard (2012) found that the effect of starting age 
on chess rating was not mediated through deliberate practice. That is, starting age correlated negatively 
with chess rating even after statistically controlling for deliberate practice, indicating that the players 
who started young tended to have an advantage as adult chess players independent of how much 
deliberate practice they had accumulated. Furthermore, in the study of composers mentioned earlier, 
Simonton (1991) found that compared with less eminent composers, the greatest composers started 
music lessons and composition lessons at a younger age than did less eminent composers and took less 
time to start making contributions to the repertoire. Taken together, this evidence suggests that there 
may be a critical period for acquiring complex skills just as there is for acquiring language.   
Intelligence 
General intelligence and basic cognitive abilities—factors which are known to be highly heritable 
(Plomin, DeFries, McClearn, & McGuffin, 2008)—also appear to play a role in the acquisition of expert 
performance. One relevant construct is working memory capacity—the ability to maintain information 
in a highly active state (Engle, 2002). Meinz and Hambrick (2010) found that although deliberate practice 
accounted for nearly half (45.1%) of the variance in pianists’ performance on a sight-reading task, 
working memory capacity accounted for an additional 7.4% of the variance—a statistically and 
practically significant effect. Ericsson and colleagues have argued that measures of working memory 
capacity themselves reflect acquired skills (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Ericsson & Delaney, 1999), but 
working memory capacity and deliberate practice correlated near zero in this study (r = .003). There was 
also no evidence for a Deliberate Practice × Working Memory Capacity interaction, indicating that 
working memory capacity was no less important a predictor of performance for pianists with thousands 
of hours of deliberate practice than it was for beginners. In line with these findings, Kopiez and Lee 
(2006) reported that working memory capacity correlated significantly (one-tailed) with sight-reading 
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performance at all but the most difficult level of music (Levels 1 – 4, rs = .23 to .32; Level 5, r = .08).10 
Thompson (1987) did not find a significant correlation between letter recall and sight-reading 
performance in flutists was not significant, but letter recall is more a test of short-term storage than 
working memory capacity (see, e.g., Engle, Tuholski, Kane, & Laughlin, 1999). Overall, it appears that 
working memory capacity has at least limited importance for musical expertise. An important question 
for future research is whether it plays a role in other musical skills (e.g., memorizing music).  
Global measures of intelligence (IQ) have also been found to correlate with performance in 
chess and music, which is consistent with the possibility that a relatively high level of intelligence is 
necessary for success in these domains. Frydman and Lynn (1992) found that young chess players had an 
average performance IQ of 129, compared to a population average of 100, and that the average was 
higher for the best players (top-third avg. = 131) in the sample than the weakest players (bottom-third 
avg. = 124). Furthermore, Grabner, Neubauer, and Stern (2006) found that, even in highly rated players, 
IQ positively predicted performance on representative chess tasks (e.g., next best move). Bilalid et al. 
(2007) found that IQ was not a significant predictor of chess rating in the sample of elite young chess 
players listed in Table 1 after statistically controlling for deliberate practice. However, the sample size 
for the elite group was only 23, and mean IQ was significantly higher for the elite group (M = 133) than 
for an “average” group (M = 114). It has been suggested that chess training may transfer to IQ tests, but 
there is currently no compelling evidence for this (see Gobet & Campitelli, 2006, for a review). Instead, 
the effects of chess training appear to be domain-specific. For example, Schneider, Gruber, Gold, and 
Opwis (1993) found that children who played chess outperformed adults in a chessboard memory task, 
whereas the adults outperformed the children in a digit recall task.  
                                                          
10
Kopiez and Lee (2006) reported a correlation of .26 between Level IV performance and working memory capacity, but did not 
flag this value as statistically significant in their Table 7 (p. 109). This is apparently a typo, because as they note, p = .03 for this 
correlation, with df = 50.   
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IQ correlates positively with music performance, as well. Luce (1965) found a correlation of .53 
(p < .01) between IQ and sight-reading performance in high school band members, and Salis (1977) 
reported a correlation of .58 between these variables in a university sample. Gromko (2004) found 
positive correlations between both verbal ability and spatial ability (rs = .35 - .49) and sight-reading 
performance in high school wind players, and Hayward and Gromko (2009) found a significant positive 
correlation (r = .24) between a measure of spatial ability based on three ETS tests and sight-reading 
performance in university wind players. Ruthsatz et al. (2008) found that Raven’s scores correlated 
positively and significantly with musical achievement in high school band members (r = .25). This 
correlation was non-significant in a sample of more highly accomplished conservatory students and 
music majors, but this could have been due to a ceiling effect on Raven’s, as these participants had been 
heavily selected for cognitive ability.  
Ruthsatz and Detterman (2003) documented the case of a 6-year old piano prodigy named 
“Derek,” who at the time of the study had played in numerous concerts, appeared on national 
television, and released two CDs of his music. Derek scored at or above the 95th percentile on a test of 
musical aptitude, and had not engaged in any activity that would qualify as deliberate practice. Derek 
did, however, score well above the average on subsets of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale: verbal 
reasoning (130), abstract reasoning (114), quantitative reasoning (120), and short-term memory (158). 
More recently, Ruthsatz and Urbach (2012) administered a standardized IQ test (the Stanford-Binet) to 
eight child prodigies, six of whom were musical prodigies. Despite full-scale IQs that ranged from 108 to 
147—just above average to above the conventional cutoff for “genius”—all of the prodigies were at or 
above the 99th percentile for working memory (indeed, six scored at the 99.9th percentile).  
The results of the landmark Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth (SMPY) are generally 
relevant to this discussion (see Robertson, Smeets, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2010). As part of a youth talent 
search, a large sample of children took the SAT by age 13, and those scoring in the top 1% were 
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identified as “gifted” and tracked over the next two decades. Remarkably, individual differences in test 
scores—even within this highly restricted range of ability—predicted individual differences in scientific 
achievements. For example, compared to participants who were “only” in the 99.1 percentile for overall 
SAT score—which largely reflects general intelligence (Frey & Detterman, 2004)—those participants who 
had scored in the 99.9 percentile—the profoundly gifted—were 3.6 times more likely to have earned a 
Ph.D. in a Science, Technology, Engineering, & Mathematics (STEM) discipline, 5 times more likely to 
have published an article in a STEM journal, and 3 times more likely to have registered a patent 
(Lubinski, 2009).  
General intelligence does not always predict performance. In a study of football players, Lyons, 
Hoffman, and Michel (2009) found that scores on the Wonderlic Personnel Test, a widely administered 
group intelligence test, correlated essentially zero with success in the National Football League, even in 
the quarterback position, which is believed to place the highest demand on information processing. 
Furthermore, Hambrick et al. (2012) found that spatial ability positively predicted success in a complex 
geological problem solving task in novice geologists, but not in experts. There is a clear need to develop 
theories of expert performance that take into account how the contribution of cognitive ability factors 
to performance vary across domains (e.g., cognitive vs. physical domains), and across situations or tasks 
in a given domain.  
Personality 
Ericsson et al. (1993) hypothesized that personality factors may have an indirect effect on the 
acquisition of expert performance through deliberate practice:  
…within our framework we would expect that several would expect that several ‘personality’ 
factors, such as individual differences in activity levels and emotionality may differentially 
predispose individuals toward deliberate practice as well as allow these individuals to sustain 
very high levels of it for extended periods” (p. 393). 
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There is now evidence to support this part of the deliberate practice view. In a study of Spelling Bee 
contestants, Duckworth, Kirby, Tsukayama, Berstein, and Ericsson (2012) found that the effect of 
“grit”—a personality factor reflecting persistence in accomplishing long-term goals—positively predicted 
deliberate practice, which in turn positively predicted spelling performance. Similarly, in a study of 
classical musicians, Bonneville-Roussy et al. (2011) found that “passion” positively predicted “mastery 
goals,” which in turn positively predicted deliberate practice, which in turn positively predicted music 
performance.  
This evidence suggests that personality is an important part of the expert performance puzzle. 
But, critically, this evidence does not suggest that personality is one of the “other” factors that accounts 
for the variance in performance that deliberate practice leaves unexplained (see the dark gray region of 
Figures 1 and 3). That is, effects of the personality factors on performance in these studies were, as 
Ericsson (2012) stressed in a discussion of the Duckworth et al. (2012) study, fully mediated through and 
thus completely explained by individual differences in deliberate practice. So, personality factors may 
explain why some people engage in more deliberate practice than others, but they do not appear to 
independently explain individual differences in performance.  
Genes 
There is some evidence that individual differences in performance are heritable. In the National 
Merit twin sample, Coon and Carey (1989) found heritability estimates of 38% for males and 20% for 
females for a measure of music achievement based on honors in music contests. Vinkhuyzen, van der 
Sluis, Posthuma, and Boomsma (2009) analyzed data from a study in which 1,685 twin pairs rated their 
competence in chess, music, and several other domains on a scale from 1 (less competent than most 
people) to 4 (exceptionally skilled). For endorsement of “talent” (rating of 4 vs. 1, 2, or 3), heritability 
ranged from 50% to 92%.  
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There is also evidence for genetic effects on creativity. Based on correlations between scientific 
training/performance variables and both personality and intellectual traits, Simonton (2008) found 
nontrivial (lower-bound) heritability estimates for scientific training/performance variables—for 
example, about 25% for comprehensive exam scores and about 10% for faculty ratings. An important 
goal for future behavior genetic research on expert performance is to investigate whether there are 
genetic effects on objective measures of performance (e.g., music tasks, scientific problem solving 
tasks), and to investigate whether such effects on performance are accounted for by intelligence, 
personality, or both.  
Popular Myths about Expert Performance 
Two myths regarding deliberate practice and expert performance have taken root in the public’s 
imagination. The first myth is that people require very similar amounts of deliberate practice to acquire 
expert performance. Gladwell (2008) wrote in Outliers that Ericsson et al.’s (1993) “research suggests 
that once a musician has enough ability to get into a top music school, the thing that distinguishes one 
performer from another is how hard he or she works. That’s it.” (p. 39). Similarly, Syed (2010) wrote in 
Bounce that 
Top performers had devoted thousands of additional hours to the task of becoming master 
performers. But that’s not all. Ericsson also found that there were no exceptions to this pattern: 
nobody who had reached the elite group without copious practice, and nobody who had worked 
their socks off but failed to excel. (p. 16)    
These categorical claims are incorrect. The evidence is quite clear that some people do reach an elite 
level of performance without copious practice, while other people fail to do so despite copious practice.  
The second myth is that it requires at least ten years, or 10,000 hours, of deliberate practice to 
reach an elite level of performance. Ericsson et al. (2007) explained this idea as follows: “Our research 
shows that even the most gifted performers need a minimum of ten years (or 10,000 hours) of intense 
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training before they win international competitions” (p. 5, emphasis added). Subsequently, Gladwell 
(2008) proposed in Outliers that “Ten thousand hours is the magic number of greatness” (p. 41). More 
recently, the Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman (2011) wrote in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow that 
“Studies of chess masters have shown that at least 10,000 hours of dedicated practice…are required to 
attain the highest levels of performance” (p. 238). But the data indicate that there is an enormous 
amount of variability in deliberate practice—even in elite performers. One player in Gobet and 
Campitelli’s chess sample took 26 years of serious involvement in chess to reach a master level, while 
another player took less than 2 years to reach this level. 
Some normally functioning people may never acquire expert performance in certain domains, 
regardless of the amount of deliberate practice they accumulate. In Gobet and Campitelli’s (2007) chess 
sample, three participants estimated more than 10,000 hours of individual practice, and yet remained 
intermediate-level players. This conclusion runs counter to the egalitarian view that anyone can achieve 
most anything he or she wishes, with enough hard work. The silver lining, we believe, is that when 
people are given an accurate assessment of their abilities and of the likelihood of achieving certain goals 
given those abilities, they may gravitate towards domains in which they have a realistic chance of 
acquiring expert performance through deliberate practice. 
Beyond the Deliberate Practice View 
The debate over why and how some people become experts and other fail to do so has been a 
topic of intense debate in psychology for well over a century, and it will remain so for many years to 
come. The intensity of the debate to this point likely reflects a clash between what Cronbach (1957) 
called the two “disciplines” of scientific psychology—experimental psychology and differential 
psychology. Expertise researchers trained as experimental psychologists often seek to identify general 
principles that account for expert performance and to treat individual differences as “error,” whereas 
those trained as differential psychologists seek to identify factors that account for individual differences. 
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But as Simonton (1999) advises, “psychology must endeavor to identify all of the significant causal 
factors behind exceptional performance rather than merely rest content with whatever factor happens 
to account for the most variance” (p. 454). For researchers seriously interested in advancing the science 
of expert performance, the task now is to rise above disciplinary and ideological differences and develop 
and rigorously test theories that take into account as many potentially relevant explanatory factors as 
possible—including not only deliberate practice and other environmental variables, but heritable traits 
such as general intelligence, and task and situational factors that may moderate effects of individual-
difference variables on performance.  
An open-minded exchange of ideas among researchers with diverse theoretical and 
methodological perspectives will make this possible and shed fresh light on the origins of expert 
performance.   
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Table 1 
Correlations Between Deliberate Practice and Chess Performance 
           
            
         Chess Rating 
Study     Sample    M(SD)  N r (95% CI) rˆ (95% CI) % Var.  
  
Charness et al. (2005) - Study 1  International; novice  2032(278) 200 .54(.43, .63) .63(.50, .74) 39.7(60.3)  
     to grandmaster (adult)  
 
Charness et al. (2005) - Study 2  International; intermediate 2008(253) 164 .48(.35, .59) .56(.41, .69) 31.4(68.6)   
     to grandmaster (adult) 
 
Bilalid et al. (2007)   British; novice to  1603(109)   23 .69(.39, .86) .81(.46, 1.0) 65.6(34.4)  
     intermediate (youth)  
 
Gobet & Campitelli (2007)  Argentine; intermediate to 1988(209)   90 .42(.23, .58) .49(.27, .68) 24.0(76.0) 
grandmaster (adult) 
 
de Bruin et al. (2007)   Dutch; novice to expert  1944(259)   73 .45(.25, .62) .53(.29, .73) 28.1(71.9)  
     (youth) 
 
Howard (2012)    International; novice to  2122(168) 533 .33(.25, .40) .39(.29, .47) 15.2(84.8)  
     grandmaster (adult) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Studies are in chronological order. r, correlation between cumulative deliberate practice and chess performance. rˆ , corrected correlation. 
% var., percentage of variance in chess performance explained by deliberate practice (vs. unexplained) after correction for measurement error 
variance ( rˆ 2). Reliability coefficient for deliberate practice (rxx), .80. Reliability for chess rating (ryy), .91. For Bilalid et al., the upper-bound of the 
95% CI exceeds 1.0 and is truncated. Cumulative deliberate practice was log-transformed prior to analyses in all studies, except de Bruin et al 
(2007).
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Table 2 
Results of Reliability Analysis for Chess Performance 
 
 
                 Reliability of Deliberate Practice (rxx) 
_________________________________________________ 
 
rxx = .60  rxx = .70  rxx = .80  rxx = .90  
_________________________________________________ 
 
Avg. % variance  45.3(54.7) 38.9(61.1) 34.0(66.0) 30.2(69.8) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Avg. % variance, average percentage of variance in chess performance explained  
(vs. unexplained) by deliberate practice.  
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Table 3 
Correlations Between Deliberate Practice and Music Performance         
Study      Sample    Performance Measure  N r (95% CI) rˆ (95% CI)    % Var. 
   
Lehmann & Ericsson (1996)  Accompanists and piano Number of correctly    16 .36(-.17, .73) .43(-.20, .87) 18.5(81.5) 
     soloists    played notes 
 
Meinz (2000)    Beginning to advanced  Expert ratings of sight-  107 .41(.24, .56) .47(.27, .64) 22.1(77.9) 
     pianists    reading performances  
 
Tuffiash (2002)    Undergraduate music  Expert ratings of sight-  135 .58(.46, .68) .73(.58, .85) 53.3(46.7) 
     and non-music majors  reading performances  
 
Ruthsatz et al. (2008) - Study 1  High school band  Band director ranking  178 .34(.20, .46)  .43(.25, .58) 18.5(81.5) 
     members   of musical achievement 
 
Ruthsatz et al. (2008) - Study 2A  Music conservatory  Conservatory audition    64 .31(.07, .52) .39(.09, .65) 15.2(84.8) 
     students   score 
 
Ruthsatz et al. (2008) - Study 2B  Undergraduate music  Faculty rating of musical   19 .54(.11, .80) .68(.14, 1.00) 46.2(53.8) 
     majors    achievement 
 
Kopiez and Lee (2008)   Music institute piano  Number of correctly     52 .25(-.02, .49) .30(-.02, .58)   9.0(91.0) 
     majors and graduates  performed pitches 
 
Meinz and Hambrick (2010)  Beginning to advanced  Expert ratings of sight-    57 .67(.50, .79) .75(.56, .89) 56.3(43.7) 
     pianists    reading performances 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____ 
Note. Studies are in chronological order. r, correlation between cumulative deliberate practice and skill. rˆ , corrected correlation. % var., percentage of 
variance in music performance explained by deliberate practice after correction for measurement error variance ( rˆ 2). Reliability for deliberate practice (rxx), 
.80. Reliability for music performance (ryy): Lehman and Ericsson, 1996 (.88); Meinz, 2000 (.96); Tuffiash, 2002 (.80); Ruthsatz et al., 2008 (.80); Kopiez and 
Lee, 2008 (.88); Meinz and Hambrick, 2010 (.99).  
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Table 4 
Results of Reliability Analysis for Music Performance 
 
 
                 Reliability of Deliberate Practice (rxx) 
_________________________________________________ 
 
rxx = .60  rxx = .70  rxx = .80  rxx = .90  
_________________________________________________ 
 
Avg. % Variance  39.6(60.4) 33.8(66.2) 28.9(71.1) 26.3(73.7) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Avg. % variance, average percentage of variance in music performance explained  
(vs. unexplained) by deliberate practice.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Average percentage of variance in chess performance accounted for by deliberate 
practice, correcting for measurement error variance. 
Figure 2. Histograms showing accumulated hours of deliberate practice for “master” (n=16), 
“expert” (n=31), and “intermediate” (n=43) chess players (Gobet & Campitelli, 2007). Deliberate practice 
refers to serious study alone.  
Figure 3. Average percentage of variance in music performance accounted for by deliberate 
practice, correcting for measurement error variance. 
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Figure 1 Average percentage of variance in chess performance explained by deliberate practice correcting for  .                      ,     
measurement error variance.
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Figure 2 Histograms showing accumulated hours of deliberate practice for “master” (n=16) “expert” (n=31) and
Accumulated No. Hours of Deliberate Practice
  .                    ,    ,   
“intermediate” (n=43) chess players (Gobet & Campitelli, 2007). Deliberate practice refers to serious study alone.
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Figure 3 Average percentage of variance in music performance explained by deliberate practice correcting for  .                      ,     
measurement error variance.
